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Abstract
This article presents a preliminary approach towards characterizing political fake news on Twitter
through the analysis of their meta-data. In particular, we focus on more than 1.5M tweets collected on
the day of the election of Donald Trump as 45th president of the United States of America. We use the
meta-data embedded within those tweets in order to look for differences between tweets containing fake
news and tweets not containing them. Specifically, we perform our analysis only on tweets that went viral,
by studying proxies for users’ exposure to the tweets, by characterizing accounts spreading fake news,
and by looking at their polarization. We found significant differences on the distribution of followers, the
number of URLs on tweets, and the verification of the users.
Introduction
While fake news, understood as deliberately mislead-
ing pieces of information, have existed since long
ago (e.g. it is not unusual to receive news falsely
claiming the death of a celebrity), the term reached
the mainstream, particularly so in politics, during
the 2016 presidential election in the United States.1
Since then, governments and corporations alike (e.g.
Google2 and Facebook3) have begun efforts to tackle
fake news as they can affect political decisions.4 Yet,
the ability to define, identify and stop fake news from
spreading is limited.
Since the Obama campaign in 2008, social media
has been pervasive in the political arena in the United
States. Studies report that up to 62% of American
adults receive their news from social media.5 The
wide use of platforms such as Twitter and Facebook
has facilitated the diffusion of fake news by simpli-
fying the process of receiving content with no sig-
nificant third party filtering, fact-checking or edito-
rial judgement. Such characteristics make these plat-
forms suitable means for sharing news that, disguised
as legit ones, try to confuse readers.
Such use and their prominent rise has been con-
firmed by Craig Silverman, a Canadian journalist
who is a prominent figure on fake news:6 “In the
final three months of the US presidential campaign,
the top-performing fake election news stories on Face-
book generated more engagement than the top stories
from major news outlet”.
Our current research hence departs from the as-
sumption that social media is a conduit for fake news
and asks the question of whether fake news (as spam
was some years ago) can be identified, modelled and
eventually blocked. In order to do so, we use a sam-
ple of more that 1.5M tweets collected on November
8th 2016 —election day in the United States— with
the goal of identifying features that tweets contain-
ing fake news are likely to have. As such, our paper
aims to provide a preliminary characterization of fake
news in Twitter by looking into meta-data embedded
in tweets. Considering meta-data as a relevant factor
of analysis is in line with findings reported by Morris
et al.7 We argue that understanding differences be-
tween tweets containing fake news and regular tweets
will allow researchers to design mechanisms to block
fake news in Twitter.
Specifically, our goals are: 1) compare the char-
acteristics of tweets labelled as containing fake news
to tweets labelled as not containing them, 2) char-
acterize, through their meta-data, viral tweets con-
taining fake news and the accounts from which they
originated, and 3) determine the extent to which
tweets containing fake news expressed polarized po-
litical views.
For our study, we used the number of retweets to
single-out those that went viral within our sample.
Tweets within that subset (viral tweets hereafter) are
varied and relate to different topics. We consider that
a tweet contains fake news if its text falls within any
of the following categories described by Rubin et al.8
(see next section for the details of such categories):
serious fabrication, large-scale hoaxes, jokes taken at
face value, slanted reporting of real facts and stories
where the truth is contentious. The dataset,9 manu-
ally labelled by an expert, has been publicly released
and is available to researchers and interested parties.
From our results, the following main observations
can be made:
• Distribution in the number of retweets,
favourites and hashtags in tweets containing
fake news are not significantly different from
their counterparts in tweets not containing fake
news.
• Accounts generating fake news are compara-
tively more unverified that accounts not produc-
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ing fake news.
• There are significant differences in both the
number of friends and followers of the accounts
creating tweets with fake news when compared
with accounts not generating them.
• There are no significant differences in the num-
ber of media elements, but there are indications
that the number of URLs it is indeed different.
Our findings resonate with similar work done
on fake news such as the one from Allcot and
Gentzkow.10 Therefore, even if our study is a prelim-
inary attempt at characterizing fake news on Twitter
using only their meta-data, our results provide exter-
nal validity to previous research. Moreover, our work
not only stresses the importance of using meta-data,
but also underscores which parameters may be useful
to identify fake news on Twitter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section briefly discusses where this work is lo-
cated within the literature on fake news and con-
textualizes the type of fake news we are studying.
Then, we present our hypotheses, the data, and the
methodology we follow. Finally, we present our find-
ings, conclusions of this study, and future lines of
work.
Defining Fake news
Our research is connected to different strands of aca-
demic knowledge related to the phenomenon of fake
news. In relation to Computer Science, a recent sur-
vey by Conroy and colleagues11 identifies two popular
approaches to single-out fake news. On the one hand,
the authors pointed to linguistic approaches consist-
ing in using text, its linguistic characteristics and ma-
chine learning techniques to automatically flag fake
news. On the other, these researchers underscored
the use of network approaches, which make use of
network characteristics and meta-data, to identify
fake news.
With respect to social sciences, efforts from psy-
chology, political science and sociology, have been
dedicated to understand why people consume and/or
believe misinformation.12–15 Most of these studies
consistently reported that psychological biases such
as priming effects and confirmation bias play an im-
portant role in people ability to discern misinforma-
tion.
In relation to the production and distribution of
fake news, a recent paper in the field of Economics10
found that most fake news sites use names that re-
semble those of legitimate organizations, and that
sites supplying fake news tend to be short-lived.
These authors also noticed that fake news items are
more likely shared than legitimate articles coming
from trusted sources, and they tend to exhibit a
larger level of polarization.
The conceptual issue of how to define fake news
is a serious and unresolved issue. As the focus of
our work is not attempting to offer light on this, we
will rely on work by other authors to describe what
we consider as fake news. In particular, we use the
categorization provided by Rubin et al.8 The five
categories they described, together with illustrative
examples from our dataset, are as follows:
1. Serious fabrication. These are news stories
created entirely to deceive readers. During the
2016 US presidential election there were plenty
of examples of this (e.g. claiming a celebrity has
endorsed Donald Trump when that was not the
case). For instance: [@JebBush - Maybe Donald
negotiated a deal with his buddy @HillaryClin-
ton. Continuing this path will put her in the
White House. https: // t. co/ AlvByiSrMn ]
2. Large-scale hoaxes. Deceptions that are then
reported in good faith by reputable sources. A
recent example would be the story that the
founder of Corona beer made everyone in his
home village a millionaire in his will. For
instance: [@FullFrontalSamB - Unfortunately
Melania copied HER ballot from Michelle so...
Donald just voted for Hillary. #ElectionDay
https: // t. co/ x2ZimtFxyl ]
3. Jokes taken at face value. Humour sites
such as the Onion or Daily Mash present fake
news stories in order to satirise the media. Is-
sues can arise when readers see the story out
of context and share it with others. For in-
stance: [@BBCTaster - BREAKING NEWS: If
you face-swap @realDonaldTrump with @Mayo-
rofLondon you get Owen Wilson. https: // t.
co/ YY8a20wQVP ]
4. Slanted reporting of real facts. Selectively-
chosen but truthful elements of a story put to-
gether to serve an agenda. One of the most
prevalent examples of this is the well-known
problems of voting machine faults. For instance:
[@NeilTurner - @realDonaldTrump Trump pre-
dicted it. #BrusselsAttack https: // t. co/
BM3UxA7heR ]
5. Stories where the ‘truth’ is contentious.
On issues where ideologies or opinions clash —
for example, territorial conflicts— there is some-
times no established baseline for truth. Re-
porters may be unconsciously partisan, or per-
ceived as such. For instance: [@FoxNews - Re-
port: @HillaryClinton’s plan would raise taxes
$1.3T/10 years. https: // t. co/ Dh1tWM4FAP ]
Research Hypotheses
Previous works on the area (presented in the section
above) suggest that there may be important deter-
minants for the adoption and diffusion of fake news.
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Our hypotheses builds on them and identifies three
important dimensions that may help distinguishing
fake news from legit information:
1. Exposure. Given that psychological effects
such as priming and confirmation biases are
likely to increase the probability an individual
believes in a certain piece of information, we be-
lieve exposure to misinformation is an important
determinant of a fake news distribution strategy.
2. Characterization. Given that distributors of
fake news may want to simulate legitimate in-
formation outlets, we believe it is important to
analyse specific features that may help a fake
news outlet ‘disguise’ as a legit one.
3. Polarization. Given that fake news outlets are
more likely to attract attention with polarizing
content (See15), we believe the level of polariza-
tion is an important determinant of a fake news
distribution strategy.
Taking those three dimensions into account, we
propose the following hypotheses about the features
that we believe can help to identify tweets containing
fake news from those not containing them. They will
be later tested over our collected dataset.
Exposure.
H1A: The average number of retweets of a viral
tweet containing fake news is larger than that
of viral tweets not containing them.
H1B: The average number of hashtags and user
mentions in viral tweets with fake news is larger
than that of viral tweets with no fake news in
them.
Characterization.
H2A: Viral tweets containing fake news have a
larger number of URLs.
H2B: Creation date of an account generating tweets
with fake news is more recent that those ac-
counts tweeting non-fake news content.
H2C: The rate of friends/followers of accounts
tweeting fake news is larger than the rate of
those creating tweets without them.
Polarization.
H3: Viral tweets containing fake news are slanted
towards one candidate.
Data and Methodology
For this study, we collected publicly available
tweets using Twitter’s public API. Given the nature
of the data, it is important to emphasize that
such tweets are subject to Twitter’s terms and
conditions which indicate that users consent to
the collection, transfer, manipulation, storage, and
disclosure of data. Therefore, we do not expect
ethical, legal, or social implications from the us-
age of the tweets. Our data was collected using
search terms related to the presidential election
held in the United States on November 8th 2016.
Particularly, we queried Twitter’s streaming API,
more precisely the filter endpoint of the streaming
API, using the following hashtags and user handles:
#MyVote2016, #ElectionDay, #electionnight,
@realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton. The
data collection ran for just one day (Nov 8th 2016).
One straightforward way of sharing information on
Twitter is by using the retweet functionality, which
enables a user to share a exact copy of a tweet with
his followers. Among the reasons for retweeting,
Body et al.16 reported the will to: 1) spread tweets
to a new audience, 2) to show one’s role as a listener,
and 3) to agree with someone or validate the thoughts
of others. As indicated, our initial interest is to char-
acterize tweets containing fake news that went viral
(as they are the most harmful ones, as they reach a
wider audience), and understand how it differs from
other viral tweets (that do not contain fake news).
For our study, we consider that a tweet went viral if
it was retweeted more than 1000 times.
Once we have the dataset of viral tweets, we elim-
inated duplicates (some of the tweets were collected
several times because they had several handles) and
an expert manually inspected the text field within
the tweets to label them as containing fake news, or
not containing them (according to the characteriza-
tion presented before). This annotated dataset9 is
publicly available and can be freely reused.
Finally, we use the following fields within tweets
(from the ones returned by Twitter’s API) to com-
pare their distributions and look for differences be-
tween viral tweets containing fake news and viral
tweets not containing fake news:
• Exposure: created at, retweet count,
favourites count and hashtags.
• Characterization. screen name, verified,
urls, followers count, friends count and
media.
• Polarization. text and hashtags.
In the following section, we provide graphical de-
scriptions of the distribution of each of the identified
attributes for the two sets of tweets (those labelled as
containing fake news and those labelled as not con-
taining them). Where appropriate, we normalized
and/or took logarithms of the data for better repre-
sentation. To gain a better understanding of the sig-
nificance of those differences, we use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test with the null hypothesis that both dis-
tributions are equal.
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Results
The sample collected consisted on 1 785 855 tweets
published by 848 196 different users. Within our
sample, we identified 1327 tweets that went viral
(retweeted more than 1000 times by the 8th of
November 2016) produced by 643 users. Such small
subset of viral tweets were retweeted on 290 841 oc-
casions in the observed time-window.
The 1327 ‘viral’ tweets were manually annotated
as containing fake news or not. The annotation was
carried out by a single person in order to obtain a
consistent annotation throughout the dataset. Out
of those 1327 tweets, we identified 136 as potentially
containing fake news (according to the categories pre-
viously described), and the rest were classified as ‘non
containing fake news’. Note that the categorization
is far from being perfect given the ambiguity of fake
news themselves and human judgement involved in
the process of categorization. Because of this, we
do not claim that this dataset can be considered a
ground truth.
The following results detail characteristics of these
tweets along the previously mentioned dimensions.
Table 1 reports the actual differences (together with
their associated p-values) of the distributions of vi-
ral tweets containing fake news and viral tweets not
containing them for every variable considered.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
feature difference p-value
Followers 0.2357 2.6E-6
Friends 0.1747 0.0012
URLs 0.1285 0.0358
Favourites 0.1218 0.0535
Mentions 0.1135 0.0862
Media 0.0948 0.2231
Retweets 0.0609 0.7560
Hashtags 0.0350 0.9983
Table 1: For each one of the selected features, the
table shows the difference between the set of tweets
containing fake news and those non containing them,
and the associated p-value (applying a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test). The null hypothesis is that both dis-
tributions are equal (two sided). Results are ordered
by decreasing p-value.
Exposure
Figure 1 shows that, in contrast to other kinds of viral
tweets, those containing fake news were created more
recently. As such, Twitter users were exposed to fake
news related to the election for a shorter period of
time.
However, in terms of retweets, Figure 2 shows
no apparent difference between containing fake news
or not containing them. That is confirmed by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test, which does not discard
the hypothesis that the associated distributions are
equal.
Figure 1: Distribution of the date of creation of the
tweets that were viral on November 8th. For clarity,
the image only shows the year 2016, and no more
than 150 tweets per day.
Figure 2: Density distributions of achieved retweets
for tweets in our dataset 1)containing fake news and
2)not containing them. No differences are apparent.
Figure 3: Density distributions of the number of
favourites that the user generating the tweet has.
The differences are not statistically significant.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of hashtags used in tweets labelled as containing fake news and those
labelled as not containing them.
In relation to the number of favourites, users that
generated at least a viral tweet containing fake news
appear to have, on average, less favourites than users
that do not generate them. Figure 3 shows the dis-
tribution of favourites. Despite the apparent visual
differences, the difference are not statistically signif-
icant.
Finally, the number of hashtags used in viral fake
news appears to be larger than those in other viral
tweets. Figure 4 shows the density distribution of
the number of hashtags used. However, once again,
we were not able to find any statistical difference
between the average number of hashtags in a viral
tweet and the average number of hashtags in viral
fake news.
Characterization
We found that 82 users within our sample were
spreading fake news (i.e. they produced at least one
tweet which was labelled as fake news). Out of those,
34 had verified accounts, and the rest were unverified.
From the 48 unverified accounts, 6 have been sus-
pended by Twitter at the date of writing, 3 tried to
imitate legitimate accounts of others, and 4 accounts
have been already deleted. Figure 5 shows the pro-
portion of verified accounts to unverified accounts for
viral tweets (containing fake news vs. not containing
fake news). From the chart, it is clear that there is
a higher chance of fake news coming from unverified
accounts.
Turning to friends, accounts distributing fake news
appear to have, on average, the same number of
friends than those distributing tweets with no fake
Figure 5: Tweets labelled as containing fake news
mostly come from non-verified users. This contrasts
with the opposite pattern for tweets non containing
them (which mostly originate from verified accounts).
news. However, the density distribution of friends
from the accounts (Figure 6) shows that there is in-
deed a statistically significant difference in their dis-
tributions.
If we take into consideration the number of follow-
ers, accounts generating viral tweets with fake news
do have a very different distribution on this dimen-
sion, compared to those accounts generating viral
tweets with no fake news (see Figure 7). In fact,
such differences are statistically significant.
A useful representation for friends and followers is
the ratio between friends/followers. Figures 8 and
9 show this representation. Notice that accounts
spreading viral tweets with fake news have, on av-
erage, a larger ratio of friends/followers. The distri-
bution of those accounts not generating fake news is
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Figure 6: Density distributions (for tweets labelled as
containing fake news, and tweets labelled as not con-
taining them) of the number of friends that the user
generating the tweet has. Difference is statistically
significant.
Figure 7: Density distributions of the number of
followers that the accounts generating viral tweets
(within our sample) have. Accounts producing fake
news have a narrower window of followers.
Figure 8: Density distribution of friends/followers ra-
tio, showing quartiles. Accounts that generate fake
news tend to have a higher ratio value.
more evenly distributed.
With respect to the number of mentions, Figure 10
shows that viral tweets labelled as containing fake
news appear to use mentions to other users less fre-
quently than viral tweets not containing fake news.
In other words, tweets containing fake news mostly
contain 1 mention, whereas other tweets tend to have
two). Such differences are statistically significant.
Figure 9: Density distribution of friends/followers
ratio. Note that they do not follow a normal dis-
tribution. A higher friends/followers ratio exists for
accounts that has at least produced a tweet labelled
as containing fake news.
Figure 10: Number of mentions within tweets la-
belled as containing fake news and tweets not con-
taining them. There is almost a similar distribution
of 1 and 2 mentions for tweets containing fake news.
This contrasts with tweets not containing fake news,
in which 2 mentions is much more common.
The analysis (Figure 11) of the presence of media
in the tweets in our dataset shows that tweets labelled
as not containing fake news appear to present more
media elements than those labelled as fake news.
However, the difference is not statistically significant.
On the other hand, Figure 12 shows that viral
tweets containing fake news appear to include more
URLs to other sites than viral tweets that do not
contain fake news. In fact, the difference between
the two distributions is statistically significant (as-
suming α = 0.05).
Polarization
Finally, manual inspection of the text field of those
viral tweets labelled as containing fake news shows
that 117 of such tweets expressed support for Don-
ald Trump, while only 8 supported Hillary Clinton.
The remaining tweets contained fake news related to
other topics, not expressing support for any of the
candidates.
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Figure 11: Number of media elements embedded
within viral tweets (labelled as containing fake news
vs. labelled as not containing them)
Figure 12: Number of URLs embedded within viral
tweets (with fake news vs. without them). Differ-
ences are statistically significant with α = 0.05
Discussion
As a summary, and constrained by our existing
dataset, we made the following observations regard-
ing differences between viral tweets labelled as con-
taining fake news and viral tweets labelled as not
containing them:
• Less than 0.1% of the tweets went viral. Out of
those, only 10% were labelled as containing fake
news.
• Tweets containing fake news that became viral
during the day of the election were mostly cre-
ated very shortly before that day or in the day.
That contrasts with tweets not containing fake
news (which were initially created much before
election day).
• Considering retweets, favourites and hashtags as
proxies for exposures, we did not find any differ-
ence between viral tweets labelled as containing
fake news and viral tweets labelled as not con-
taining them.
• The characterization of accounts spreading fake
news has shown that the proportion of unveri-
fied accounts that generates at least a tweet con-
taining fake news is larger than that of accounts
spreading tweets not labelled as fake news.
• Even if the accounts producing fake news are,
on average, following the same number of other
users than those producing tweet with no fake
news in them, the distribution of followers are
statistically different.
• There is no significant difference between the
number of media elements in viral tweets la-
belled as containing fake news and viral tweets
labelled as not containing them.
• Viral tweets labelled as containing fake news
tend to have more URLs than viral tweets with
labelled as not containing fake news.
• Regarding polarization, fake news were heavily
supportive of the Trump campaign.
These findings (related to our initial hypothesis in
Table 2) clearly suggest that there are specific pieces
of meta-data about tweets that may allow the iden-
tification of fake news. One such parameter is the
time of exposure. Viral tweets containing fake news
are shorter-lived than those containing other type of
content. This notion seems to resonate with our find-
ings showing that a number of accounts spreading
fake news have already been deleted or suspended
by Twitter by the time of writing. If one considers
that researchers using different data have found simi-
lar results,10 it appears that the lifetime of accounts,
together with the age of the questioned viral content
could be useful to identify fake news. In the light
of this finding, accounts newly created should prob-
ably put under higher scrutiny than older ones. This
in fact, would be a nice a-priori bias for a Bayesian
classifier.
Accounts spreading fake news appear to have a
larger proportion of friends/followers (i.e. they have,
on average, the same number of friends but a smaller
number of followers) than those spreading viral con-
tent only. Together with the fact that, on average,
tweets containing fake news have more URLs than
those spreading viral content, it is possible to hy-
pothesize that, both, the ratio of friends/followers of
the account producing a viral tweet and number of
URLs contained in such a tweet could be useful to
single-out fake news in Twitter. Not only that, but
our finding related to the number of URLs is in line
with intuitions behind the incentives to create fake
news commonly found in the literature10 (in partic-
ular that of obtaining revenue through click-through
advertising).
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the content
of viral fake news was highly polarized. This finding
is also in line with those of Alcott et al.10 This fea-
ture suggests that textual sentiment analysis of the
7
Hypothesis
H1A: The average number of retweets of a viral tweet containing fake news is larger
than that of viral tweets not containing them
NOT CONFIRMED
H1B: The average number of hashtags and user mentions in viral tweets with fake
news is larger than that of viral tweets with no fake news in them.
NOT CONFIRMED
H2A: Viral tweets containing fake news have a larger number of URLs. CONFIRMED
H2B: Creation date of an account generating tweets with fake news is more recent
that those accounts tweeting non-fake news content.
CONFIRMED
H2C: The rate of friends/followers of accounts tweeting fake news is larger than the
rate of those creating tweets without them.
CONFIRMED
H3: Viral tweets containing fake news are slanted towards one candidate. CONFIRMED
Table 2: Summary of our conclusions, and tested hypothesis
content of tweets (as most researchers do), together
with the above mentioned parameters from meta-
data, may prove useful for identifying fake news.
Conclusions
With the election of Donald Trump as President of
the United States, the concept of fake news has be-
come a broadly-known phenomenon that is getting
tremendous attention from governments and media
companies. We have presented a preliminary study
on the meta-data of a publicly available dataset of
tweets that became viral during the day of the 2016
US presidential election. Our aim is to advance the
understanding of which features might be character-
istic of viral tweets containing fake news in compari-
son with viral tweets without fake news.
We believe that the only way to automatically
identify those deceitful tweets (i.e. containing fake
news) is by actually understanding and modelling
them. Only then, the automation of the processes
of tagging and blocking these tweets can be success-
fully performed. In the same way that spam was
fought, we anticipate fake news will suffer a similar
evolution, with social platforms implementing tools
to deal with them. With most works so far focusing
on the actual content of the tweets, ours is a novel
attempt from a different, but also complementary,
angle.
Within the used dataset, we found there are dif-
ferences around exposure, characteristics of accounts
spreading fake news and the tone of the content.
Those findings suggest that it is indeed possible to
model and automatically detect fake news. We plan
to replicate and validate our experiments in an ex-
tended sample of tweets (until 4 months after the
US election), and tests the predictive power of the
features we found relevant within our sample.
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